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Securing Vulnerable Nuclear Materials: A Critical US National Security Agenda

In recent years, there has been a sea change in thinking about nuclear weapons.  Security experts, led by the likes of former Cold Warriors Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, have recognized that the threat of unchecked proliferation radically increases the chances of an accidental or regional nuclear war or a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon.  That's why there is a growing bipartisan consensus among military and security experts who are promoting a nuclear security agenda aimed at reducing this threat – including securing nuclear materials worldwide.  Last month, for the first time ever, forty-seven world leaders came together at the Nuclear Security Summit and agreed that nuclear terrorism is "one of the most challenging threats to international security." They also agreed to do something about it, including endorsing the U.S. goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material in four years. 

But tackling this threat will take both real money and political commitment from our Members of Congress.  This is where you come in!  

Fissile Materials Policy

PSR physicians seek to reduce risk by creating a more manageable and stable world:

• Supporting a ban on all production of fissile material used in nuclear weapons and increased controls on the export of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) ultimately preventing weapons grade uranium from ending up in the hands of terrorists and the catastrophic consequences of nuclear warfare
• Opposing the use of nuclear power as an alternative energy source because plants represent a danger to national security 
• Emphasizing the fact that the reprocessing of spent plutonium is a proliferation risk

A recent International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons report, “Zero is the only option,” described the unique destructive power of nuclear weapons and the far-reaching medical consequences of their use. Even a limited nuclear war, involving less than 1% of the current arsenals, could trigger a global famine with the potential to kill 1 billion people.

Fissile material is intrinsically dangerous but poses a larger threat when it is improperly secured.  Radioactive materials “disappear” on a daily basis, and according to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), an average of 200 radiation sources are stolen, lost, or abandoned in the United States every year. Russia’s incidence of missing radioactive materials is even higher.  At least 40 kilograms of weapons-usable uranium and plutonium have been stolen from poorly protected nuclear facilities in Russia in the last 10 years. 

The primary limiting factor for a terrorist organization to detonate a nuclear weapon in a major metropolitan city is acquiring sufficient fissile materials to make the weapon. The technical “know how” to build a weapon is available on the internet and in physics classrooms at University. The amount of fissile materials necessary to build nuclear arms varies with the degree of enrichment and weapon design sophistication.  With a higher enrichment level, the less Enriched Uranium or plutonium necessary to make a bomb. According to a Manhattan Project physicist, a terrorist would have a good chance of setting off a major explosion by merely dropping half of the fissile material onto the other half.  A low-yield “dirty” bomb can be made from reactor grade plutonium and could easily serve a terrorist’s purposes.  Crude bombs can be built after acquiring materials on the black market or damage can be done to a nuclear facility after a terrorist attack.

In order to help combat the danger of loose fissile materials, the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty seeks to limit the pool of materials available for manufacturing, place a formal moratorium on fissile material production, aid nuclear disarmament by making reductions in nuclear arsenals irreversible, and have the reduction in arms cover both existing stocks of fissile materials in addition to future production.  In order for the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty to be successful, its entry into force is crucial.  A specific number of states must ratify or a specified number of particular states must do so.  All fissile material producers must also impose a production ban on themselves.  Provisions for regular review of the treaty will serve to assuage the fears of states with little or no nuclear power.  It will allow for the invention of new technology and concerns over implementation to be revisited and allow for amendments to the treaty.  Additionally, compliance provisions that handle breaches of the treaty or a mechanism to handle these breaches must be included..  Ideally, a verification system that will be applied to the entire fuel cycle and geared to the detection of undeclared production facilities and of nuclear material should be created. 

Not only the containment but also the end of fissile material production is of utmost importance.  Continued proliferation of this material in the United States and abroad represents a major threat to national security especially if it makes its way into the hands of terrorists.  Join us and take advantage of the historic opportunity that we have to mark the beginning of the end of nuclear weapons and write a letter to your representative asking for the first steps towards curbing the proliferation of fissile materials.


 
Researcher Corner

Potential Sources of Fissile Material Info:

Fissile Materials Working Group
NTI Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty analysis
Arms Control Center Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Factsheet
Defence Journal Fissile Material Article
International Panel on Fissile Materials Blog

Glossary of Terms:

1)    Fissile materials – A nuclide capable of undergoing fission after capturing low-energy thermal neutrons.  Includes highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, the essential ingredients for building nuclear weapons and powering nuclear reactors.

2)    Highly enriched uranium – Uranium enriched to 20% U-235 or more.  The composition of HEU has been increased through isotope separation.

3)    Plutonium – A naturally radioactive element that can also be produced artificially by neutron bombardment of uranium.

4)    Reprocessing – Uses chemical procedures to separate the useful components (especially the remaining uranium and newly created plutonium) from the fission products and other radioactive waste in spent nuclear fuel obtained from nuclear reactors.

5)    Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty - Seeks to limit the pool of materials available for manufacturing, place a formal moratorium on fissile material production, aid nuclear disarmament by making reductions in nuclear arsenals irreversible, and have the reduction in arms cover both existing stocks of fissile materials in addition to future production.